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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
A. The Third District Judicial Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
had subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Appellant resided in that 
district for three months prior to the commencement of the action, and the action 
involved dissolution of the marriage between the parties. Utah Code Ann. §§30-3-
1(2) and 30-3-5(1). 
B. The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over divorce 
matters pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
C. A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on January 15, 2002. 
An Amended Decree of Divorce was entered February 14, 2002. Appellant filed 
his Notice of Appeal on February 13, 2002. The Amended Decree of Divorce was 
a final judgment. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-1(2) 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(2) 
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IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and Appellee were married August 9,1993. Record on Appeal, 
213,113. The parties had no children of their own, but Appellee has a 17-year-old 
son from a previous marriage. Id., 214,11114,6. They separated on January 11, 
2001. Id. 
During the marriage, Appellant purchased a new 2000 Harley-Davidson 
motorcycle for $18,875.42. Record on Appeal, 318, page 37, lines 10-11. Both 
parties presented conflicting evidence as to this vehicle's value, and the trial court 
set its value at $19,000. Record on Appeal, 196, H6. The trial court found the 
payoff on the motorcycle to be $5,452 and ordered the parties to split the equity 
after a credit was given to Appellant for proceeds from the sale of another vehicle. 
Record on Appeal, 196,111164-69. 
During the course of the marriage, the parties also purchased a 1995 
Harley-Davidson motorcycle. Record on Appeal, 318, page 35, lines 20-25. 
Appellee sold the motorcycle for $9,400. Record on Appeal, 318, page 36, lines 
1-6. After hearing conflicting testimony regarding the value of this vehicle, the 
trial court set its value at $9,400 and ordered the parties to split the equity. Record 
on Appeal, 195-6, WI63-64, 69. Also after hearing conflicting evidence, the court 
valued the party's marital 1992 Ford F250 truck at $7,500 and awarded it to 
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Appellant subject to a credit to Appellee of $3,750.00 representing Vz of the 
vehicles value. Record on Appeal, 196,1170. 
Appellant had numerous construction tools including compressors and hand 
tools. Some of these were purchased prior to the marriage, others after. Appellee 
purchased a diamond ring during the marriage and later sold it to her mother for 
$500. Record on Appeal, 198, Hf 77-78. The trial court found that this sale was 
for less than the ring's actual value. Id, On finding that no detailed evidence was 
presented regarding the value of Appellant's tools, the trial court did not give 
either party a credit for these items. Id., 225,111177-78 
Appellee is employed as the office manager for Red Rock Brewing 
Company with a net monthly income of $2,218.66 and reasonable and necessary 
living expenses of 3,519.30. Record on Appeal, 318, page 42, lines 4-9, 198,1181, 
200, U91. Appellant is employed as a firefighter with a net monthly income of 
$3,170, and reasonable and necessary living expenses of $2,576 after the sale of 
the marital home. Id., 227-229, Ml 100, 115. Based on Appellee's shortfall of 
$1,300 and Appellant's ability to pay, the trial court awarded Appellee alimony of 
$250 per month until the marital home was sold and $500 per month thereafter, for 
the length of the marriage. Record on Appeal, 239,1f1f 15-16, 261,114. 
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The court awarded the Appellant the Trendwest and Marriott time shares 
subject to the debt thereon based upon Appellant's testimony that he wished to 
retain them. Record on Appeal, 318 page 207, lines 10-25, page 208, lines 1-16. 
Appellant testified he was told he could find somebody to take over the payments 
on the timeshares, and Appellee testified they were a luxury item. Record on 
Appeal, 318, page 203, lines 3-5. 
During trial, and over Appellant's objections, the trial court allowed the 
rebuttal testimony of Ms. Barbara Underhill, certified public accountant. Ms. 
Underhill testified the party's allocation of the mortgage interest deduction on the 
marital home was incorrect and would expose the parties to an increased risk of 
audit from the IRS. Record on Appeal, 318, pages 261-2, lines 14-25 and 1-11. 
Ms. Underhill also testified as to the appropriateness of Appellant's mileage 
deduction. Id. The court found the parties were at an increased risk of an audit and 
financial loss unless Appellant filed an amended return claiming only one-half of 
the mortgage interest deduction rather than the entire deduction as he had 
previously done. M, 239,1112. 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court heard extensive evidence during the two-day trial of this 
matter. After taking the matter under advisement, the court issued 27 pages of 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, including 123 separate paragraphs of 
factual findings. Record on Appeal, 182. As in all trials, there were numerous 
hotly contested factual issues. There was conflicting evidence presented regarding 
the valuation of several items of martial property. In its role as fact finder, the trial 
court resolved these issues, some in favor of Appellant and some in favor of 
Appellee. The trial court entered detailed findings supporting its decisions. 
Appellant would like to retry on appeal the factual issues decided against him by 
the trial court. 
Next, Appellant attacks the trial court's modest award of alimony to 
Appellee. As the record demonstrates, the trial court carefully considered the 
Jones factors in making its award. The court made some adjustments to the 
parties' claimed reasonable and necessary living expenses and to the parties' 
claimed income. In the end, however, Appellant's income being 2.27 times 
greater than Appellee's, a modest award of $500 per month alimony was awarded 
to Appellee. 
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Finally, Appellant challenges the trial court's admission of the rebuttal 
testimony of Ms. Underhill, a certified public accountant. Appellant testified at 
trial that he helped prepare his year 2000 taxes and that he claimed certain 
exemptions and deductions Ms. Underhill's testimony related to Appellant's 2000 
tax return and his claimed exemptions and deductions. Even if this Court should 
somehow find the trial court erred in allowing Ms. Underhill's testimony, any such 
error was harmless. Given the fact that Appellant claimed 100% of the mortgage 
interest deduction for 2000, and Appellee also claimed 50% of the mortgage 
interest deduction for the same year, the trial court would have reached the same 
inevitable conclusion that it did: one of the parties must amend their return. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court's Division and Valuation of the Marital Property Is Proper. 
The trial court's division and valuation of the marital property is proper and 
well supported by adequate findings based on the evidence. It should first be 
noted that "a trial court has considerable discretion concerning property [division] 
in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity." Elman 
v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176, 180 (Utah App. 2002) (quoting Schaumberg v. 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah App. 1994). This Court will only disturb 
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the trial court's property and valuation decisions "when there is a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." Id. 
Finally, "there is no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of assets in 
a divorce action." Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah App. 1993). 
It is the Appellant's burden to marshal all the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings. Appellant must then show the evidence to be legally insufficient 
to support these findings, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial 
court. See Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 79 (Utah App. 1991). Appellant has 
clearly failed to meet this burden. 
1. The 2000 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle was Valued and Allocated 
Correctly. 
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the 2000 
Harley-Davidson motorcycle and in failing to make adequate findings as to why it 
did not give Appellant credit for his allegedly pre-marital contribution to this 
asset. 
The trial court found the 2000 Harley-Davidson had an average retail price 
of $19,000. Record on appeal, 223,11 66. Petitioner's purchase agreement 
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indicated a purchase price of $18,875.42. Mrs. Shaw testified the motorcycle had 
a value of between $14,000 and $19,000, with an actual value of $18,000. Record 
on Appeal, 318, page 39, lines 21-25. Mr. Shaw testified the motorcycle's value 
was $16,000, but in other documents submitted to the court conceded its value is 
$18,000. Id. 11 67. Mr. Shaw also testified there was a waiting time for new 
Harley-Davidsons motorcycles. Record on appeal, 318, page 152, lines 2-13. 
The trial court is not obligated to accept Appellant's proposed valuation. 
See Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 199 (Utah App. 1990) (stating that "failure of 
the court to accept one party's proposed valuation of property is not an abuse of 
discretion."). This issue, like many others at trial, was contested. Conflicting 
evidence was presented and considered by the trial court. The trial court 
performed its duty and resolved the conflict. Appellant's argument is nothing but 
an attempt to have this Court substitute its judgment for that of the trial court and 
re-try this case on appeal. It can hardly be argued that a valuation of $1,000 more 
than that conceded by Mr. Shaw and $124.58 more than a recent purchase price 
amounts to a "clear abuse of discretion" which results in "serious inequity." 
Appellant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
make adequate findings as to why it did not give Appellant credit for his allegedly 
pre-marital contribution to this asset is also without merit. Appellant claims he 
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traded-in a 1986 Harley-Davidson motorcycle and received a $9,400 credit toward 
the purchase of the 2000 Harley-Davidson motorcycle. Appellant's Brief, page 
13. It is conceded by Appellant, however, that "there was no testimony from 
either party as to the date Appellant purchased [the trade-in], or as to whether it 
was premarital." Appellant's Brief, page 15. Furthermore, Appellant admits he 
did not request a credit for this allegedly premarital motorcycle at trial. Id. 
Despite this lack of evidence, Appellant now claims the trial court abused 
its discretion in failing to consider Appellant's premarital contribution to the 2000 
Harley-Davidson. It is difficult to imagine how the trial court could have 
considered evidence that was not before it and made findings on such non-existent 
evidence. 
2. The 1995 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle was also Valued Properly. 
Based on Mrs. Shaw's testimony, the trial court found that Mrs. Shaw sold 
the 1995 motorcycle for $9,400. Record on Appeal, 195,1162. The trial court also 
found that this amount was fair and reasonable compensation for a motorcycle of 
the same year and in like condition and repair. Id. 1163. The trial court had 
conflicting evidence before it on this issue. Mrs. Shaw testified the motorcycle 
had an oil leak, which was reflected in a lower sales price. Record on Appeal, 
318, page 36, lines 12-14. She also testified she researched the NADA blue book 
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value before selling it and learned that it was $9,500. Id., page 77, lines 6-12. 
Mrs. Shaw also testified that she looked at advertisements for similar vehicles in 
the newspaper before selling the motorcycle. Id., lines 15-17. 
Appellant also testified regarding the value of the 1995 Harley-Davidson. 
He stated that he researched the NADA blue book valuation and found it to be 
$12,800. Record on Appeal, 318, page 146, lines 1-4. He also testified that he 
looked at newspaper advertisements for similar vehicles with asking prices 
between $13,000 and $15,000. He further testified that the motorcycle had 
accessories which would increase its value, and that the oil leak was cosmetic and 
would not affect the vehicle's performance. See id., page 147, lines 3-10, page 
235, lines 3-9, 15-17. Appellant also argued in closing that Mrs. Shaw wanted to 
punish him by selling the motorcycle at a price below its value. Record on 
Appeal, 318, page 277, lines 3-15. 
Once again, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to 
accept one party's proposed valuation. See Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 199 
(Utah App. 1990). There was evidence supporting both parties' positions, and the 
trial court resolved the conflict. Appellant is again attempting to retry this matter 
on appeal. 
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3. The Valuation of the 1992 Ford Truck Was Proper. 
As Appellant's Brief appropriately details, the trial court received extensive 
and conflicting evidence regarding valuation of the parties' 1992 Ford F250 pick-
up truck. See Appellant's Brief, pages 20-22. Appellee's expert estimated the 
vehicle's value "somewhere close to the $10,000 range." Record on Appeal, 318, 
page 96, lines 16-24. Appellant estimated the truck was worth between $3,500 
and $4,000. Record on Appeal, 318, page 151, lines 9-13. The trial court also 
heard evidence regarding the NADA blue book valuation, reviewed photographs 
of the vehicle, and listened to testimony regarding its condition. 
The trial court valued this vehicle at $7,500. Record on Appeal, 224,1170. 
Once again, Appellant would like to have this issue retried on appeal. The case of 
Newmeyer v. Newmeyer is instructive. In that case, the appellant's expert valued 
the parties' marital home at $122,000. See Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 
1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). Appellee's expert testified that the martial home was 
worth $112,000. See id. The trial court simply fixed the value of the home at 
$117,000. The Appellee in Newmeyer argued the trial court improperly "split" the 
difference between the values fixed by the experts, and that his expert should be 
believed. See id. The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that it 
"is nothing but an attempt to have this Court substitute its judgment for that of the 
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trial court on a contested factual issue." Id. In the instant case, there was credible 
evidence fixing the value of the vehicle anywhere between $3,500 and $10,000. 
The trial court was clearly within its discretion to establish the value at $7,500. 
4. The Trial Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Deciding the 
Diamond Ring and Construction Tools Issue. 
Appellant contends the trial court erred in apparently netting the value of 
Appellee's diamond ring against the value of Appellant's tools. Appellant's Brief, 
page 24. Appellant claims the court's factual findings that Appellee purchased a 
diamond ring for $2,400, and that there was no detailed testimony regarding the 
actual value of Appellant's tools, should be set aside as clearly erroneous. 
Appellant's Brief, page 24. The trial court found that Appellee, in order to subsist, 
had to borrow money from her parents and sell her personal property, including a 
diamond ring. Record on Appeal, 225, H77. The court found the ring was 
appraised for $4,500 for insurance purposes, and that Appellee's sale of the ring 
for $500 was less than the ring's actual value. Id. 
The court indeed did not have detailed testimony regarding the value of 
Appellant's hand tools, compressors, table saws, and other tools. The only 
testimony regarding the value of Appellant's tools was from Ms. Bennion. When 
asked if Appellee told her how much Appellant had paid for a table saw, she 
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replied, "I think it was $400, $500." Record on Appeal, page 108, lines 13-15. 
There was no other evidence regarding the value of Appellant's table saw. There 
was no specific evidence at all as to the value of Appellant's other tools such as 
his compressors and hand tools. Appellant's counsel, asked Appellant about all of 
his tools, the compressors and table saws. Appellant's counsel asked "thousands 
of dollars, correct?" Record on Appeal, 318, page 201, lines 9-13. Appellant 
responded with "most of it prior to us getting married." Id. The trial court was 
within its discretion to find that he did not have detailed testimony regarding the 
value of Appellant's compressors and other tools. 
With regard to the value of Appellee's ring, when asked if she knew how 
much Appellee paid for the ring, Ms. Bennion replied, "I think it was like $5,000." 
Record on Appeal, page 108, lines 16-18. Given the evidence, the trial court's 
finding that Appellee sold the ring for less than its value is not clearly erroneous. 
Even if the trial court made a minor factual misstatement when it found that 
Appellee purchased the ring for $2,400, this misstatement was harmless. Given the 
sparse and vague evidence before it, the trial court reasonably failed to award 
either party an equalizing payment for Appellant's tools and Appellee's sale of the 
diamond ring for less than its actual value. The evidence supports this ruling, and 
it is not based on clearly erroneous findings. 
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B. The Trial Court's Award of Alimony Is Proper. 
The trial court awarded Appellee $250 per month in alimony until the 
marital home was sold, and $500 per month thereafter, for the length of the 
marriage. Record on Appeal, 239-40, WI15-16. This award is well supported by 
the evidence and relevant legal authority. 
The general purposes of alimony are to enable the receiving spouse to 
maintain, as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, 
to prevent the receiving spouse from becoming a public charge, and to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. See Munn v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 
(Utah App. 1990). The trial court must consider three factors in awarding 
alimony: 1) the financial condition and needs of the receiving spouse; 2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to produce income for herself or himself; and 3) the 
ability of the paying spouse to provide support. See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 
P.2d 260, 264 (Utah App. 1993); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d (Utah 1985). As long 
as these factors are considered, this Court will not disturb the trial court's alimony 
award "unless such a serious inequity resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of 
discretion." Id. The trial court in this case carefully and properly considered the 
requisite factors in awarding Mrs. Shaw alimony. 
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With regard to the financial condition and needs of Mrs. Shaw, the trial 
court found her monthly living expenses of $3,519.30 to be "very fair and 
reasonable." Record on Appeal, Page 225,11 81. These expenses included items 
such as her monthly mortgage payment, revolving installment payments, 
automobile gas, insurance, and installments payments for her vehicle and her son's 
vehicle, as well as other expenses. Mrs. Shaw's net monthly income was found to 
be $2,334.66. Therefore, she had established a need for alimony based on a 
$1,300.64 shortfall. 
With regard to Mr. Shaw's ability to pay, the trial court found his net 
monthly income was $3,171.88 and his reasonable and fair living expenses upon 
the sale of the martial home to be $2,576. Record on Appeal, 227, 229, WI100, 
115. The Court further found that Mr. Shaw had misrepresented and misstated his 
actual monthly income from present employment when he claimed his earnings to 
be $2,739.99. Record on Appeal, page 206, lines 9-25, page 207, lines 109. 
Based on these findings, the trial court found Mr. Shaw had the ability to pay 
support. The trial court awarded Mrs. Shaw $250 per month in alimony until the 
marital home was sold and $500 per month thereafter, for the length of the 
marriage. Record on Appeal, 239,WI 15-16, 261,114. Appellant concedes that, 
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based on the numbers the trial court used, its decision was reasonable. See 
Appellant's Brief, 27. 
Appellant's contention that the award of $500 in permanent alimony 
contravenes the trial court's finding that Mrs. Shaw be solely liable for debts she 
incurred after the date of separation, is without merit. It ignores the fact that Mrs. 
Shaw incurred these debts to replace items she left at the marital residence. 
Record on Appeal, 318, page 56, lines 9-17, page 57, lines 17-22. Mrs. Shaw 
testified the R.C. Willey and Granite Furniture debts were to purchase a washer 
and dryer and furniture for her condominium. Id, She testified that the Lowe's 
debt was to replace a refrigerator and the debt to Dell was to replace a computer. 
Record on Appeal, 318, page 58, lines 17-21. Given the purpose of alimony, to 
approximate the parties' standard of living during the marriage, it is certainly 
reasonable for Mrs. Shaw to have expenses relating to usual household furnishings 
and appliances. As the courts have stated, "if the payor spouse's resources are 
adequate, alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic need, but should 
also consider the recipient spouse's 'station in life.'" Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 
1209,1212 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Bramme v. Bramme, 587 P.2d 144, 147 
(Utah 1997). 
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Appellant seems to be arguing that simply because Mrs. Shaw was ordered 
to be solely liable for certain debts, they somehow are not necessary and 
reasonable living expenses. If the logic of this argument is applied to Appellant, 
he would have the ability to pay more than the $500 ordered by the court. He was 
ordered to be solely liable and responsible for his Discover card debt, the debt on 
the 2000 Harley Davidson motorcycle, and the 1992 Ford F250 truck. Record on 
Appeal, Page 231, H1I129-30. Following Appellant's argument, because Mr. Shaw 
is solely responsible for these obligations, he should not get the additional benefit 
of including them in his monthly obligations. Deducting these expenses would 
significantly increase his disposable income and thus his financial ability to pay 
alimony to Mrs. Shaw. 
Appellant makes a similar argument regarding Mrs. Shaw's debt to Linda 
Tobin of $3,034. See Appellant's Brief, Page 30. The trial court found this debt 
was incurred so Mrs. Shaw could pay her share of the replacement cost of 
carpeting in the marital home. Record on Appeal, 220,111136-37. Appellant claims 
it is unfair to equally divide debts and then "by awarding permanent alimony, one 
party ends up assuming the entire debt." Brief of Appellant, Page 30. If 
Appellant's logic is followed, one party could never be awarded alimony in cases 
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where there was also a division of debt. This is clearly not the law. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion. 
Appellant implies Mrs. Shaw's purchase of a 2001 Hyundai Tiburon for 
herself and a lease of a Ford Ranger for her son was inappropriate. The trial court, 
however, found that Mrs. Shaw purchased the Hyandai Tiburon at the request and 
demand of Appellant in order to remove him from the financial obligation on the 
parties 2000 Hyundai Elantra, which had been acquired by the parties 
approximately one year earlier. Record on Appeal, Page 225,1182. Furthermore, 
the trial court found that the monthly payment on the Hyundai Tiberon is equal to 
the Hyundai Elantra, and that the exchange did not increase Mrs. Shaw's 
reasonable and necessary living expense. See id. at page 226,1185. 
Mrs. Shaw's leased a Ford Ranger truck for her 18-year-old son, Jason. 
She also contributes $100 per month toward his private school education. 
Petitioner's Exhibit 21. Appellant argues Jason is not his son and he should not 
have to "pay for his expensive transportation." See Appellant's Brief, Page 31. 
Even if Appellant is correct in his contention that he should not have to contribute 
to Jason's support, Mrs. Shaw has a demonstrated need for alimony even without 
these expenses. According to Appellant's calculations, the lease payment on the 
Ford Ranger is $200, half of the insurance and gas expense is $174.09, and Jason's 
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private school is $100. See id. The total of these expenses attributable to Jason is 
$474.09. Subtracting this amount from Mrs. Shaw's expenses of $3,519.30, still 
leaves her with a shortfall of $826.55. Even if the trial court erred in allowing her 
to include expenses relating to her son Jason, Mrs. Shaw continues to have a need 
for alimony in excess of what she was awarded. Therefore, any alleged error on 
the part of the trial court relating to these expenses was harmless. 
Finally, Appellant challenges the trial court's decision to exclude the 
payments for the parties Marriott ($250) and Worldmart ($150) timeshares from 
Appellant's monthly living expenses. The trial court found these timeshares had 
no market value and awarded them to Appellant. Record on Appeal, 221, If 44, 
228-229,11112. 
Mrs. Shaw testified that she had found a purchaser for the WorldMart 
timeshare, but Appellant testified he was unwilling to sell it. Record on Appeal, 
318, page 34, lines 4-20, page 207, lines 18-21. Appellant testified that he was 
willing to sell the Marriott timeshare. Id., page 207, lines 22-23. When asked if 
he could sell the timeshares, Appellant testified that he could "get somebody to 
assume [the] payments." Record on Appeal, 318, page 207, lines 3-5. Mrs. Shaw 
testified that the timeshares were a luxury. Id., page 33, lines 11-15, Appellant 
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agreed that it was a luxury but wished to retain it. Record on Appeal, page 207, 
lines 10-14. 
The trial court found that Appellant "overstated his living expenses." 
Record on Appeal, page 228, H105. The trial court went on to find that 
"adjustments made to the respondent's living expenses for food and household 
supplies, reducing said sum to $150 from $350 claimed, reducing entertainment by 
$100, and eliminating the timeshare payment will result in an immediate savings 
to respondent of $656 per month." Id., pages 228-229, HI 12. Given these 
findings, it is clear that the court found Appellant had overstated his expenses, and 
that these expenses were not reasonable and necessary. Therefore, it was not error 
to exclude them from Appellant's monthly expenses. 
As the record demonstrates, the trial court carefully considered each of the 
Jonesfactors in awarding alimony to Mrs. Shaw. Therefore, this Court should not 
disturb the award "unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 264 (Utah App. 1993). 
Given the parties' respective incomes and expenses, a modest alimony award of 
$500 per month is certainly equitable and should not be disturbed. 
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C. The Testimony of Appellee's Rebuttal Witness Was Properly Admitted. 
Ms. Underfill's testimony was properly admitted rebuttal testimony. Ms. 
UnderhiU, a certified public accountant was called as a rebuttal witness to testify 
regarding Appellant's income tax return for the 2000 income tax year. 
Specifically, to testify regarding Appellant's allocation of his expenses and the 
deductibility of certain claimed exemptions under IRS regulations. Record on 
Appeal, 318, page 257, lines 17-22. Appellant objected to Ms. Underbill's 
testimony arguing her testimony should have been part of Appellee's case-in-
chief, and that Appellant had not addressed how Appellee had allocated her 
expenses. Id., lines 12-16. Appellant also argued he was not given notice or an 
expert opinion report prior to trial. Id., lines 23-25. The trial court ruled that Ms. 
UnderhiU could testify as a rebuttal witness. Id., page 258, lines 4-5. 
In relevant portion, Ms. UnderhiU testified that Appellee claimed one-half 
of the mortgage interest deduction on her 2000 income tax return and that 
Appellant claimed the entire mortgage interest deduction for the same year. 
Record on Appeal, 318, page 275, lines 3-7; page 260, lines 15-19. Based on the 
inconsistencies in the tax returns, Ms. UnderhiU testified that the parties were at an 
increased risk of audit, and that one of the parties' income tax returns should be 
admitted. Id., page 261, lines 10-13. 
21 
Ms. Underhill also testified regarding the deductibility of mileage expenses 
incurred for business purposes. Record on Appeal, 318, pages 261-2, lines 14-25 
and 1-11. She stated that the mileage had to be related to business use rather than 
commuting and that if the individual was reimbursed for mileage, it would not be 
deductible. Id., lines 5-11. 
Ms. Underfill's testimony was proper rebuttal in that it related to evidence 
given by Appellant. Appellant had earlier testified that he had Federal and State 
Income Tax deductions of $951.04. Record on Appeal, page 204, lines 1-2. He 
testified that he claimed "zero" exemptions. Id., lines 6-8. Appellant also testified 
that he assisted in the preparation of his year 2000 tax return. Id., page 226, lines 
5-10. He further testified that he claimed a mileage expense of 7,488 miles, and 
that he was reimbursed by his employer for some of these miles. Id., page 227, 
lines 2-20. Appellant used these deductions and exemptions to justify or support 
his claimed income and expenses. 
Appellant's contention that Ms. Underhill's testimony should have been 
presented as part of Appellee's case-in-chief is without merit. As this Court has 
stated, "evidence should not be excluded from rebuttal merely because it could 
have been made part of the case-in-chief." Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1086 
(Utah App. 1998). Fairness requires that a party introduce evidence to rebut 
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inferences the fact finder can draw from the opposing party's evidence. See id. at 
1087. This is what occurred in the present case. 
Rebuttal evidence has been defined as "evidence tending to refute, modify, 
explain, or otherwise minimize or nullify the effect of the opponent's evidence." 
Id. at 1086 (quoting Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1338 (Utah 1993)). Ms. 
Underhill's testimony helped rebut and explain Appellant's testimony regarding 
his deductions for his mileage expenses. Appellant also testified that he assisted in 
the preparation of his 2000 tax return. Record on Appeal, 318, page 226, lines 5-
10, page 260, lines 3-6. In so doing, he opened the door to Ms. Underbill's 
testimony and put the accuracy and legality of this return at issue. Therefore, the 
trial court's ruling was proper. 
Appellant argues the trial court made no findings regarding the basis for 
overruling Appellant's objection. Appellant's Brief, page 37. Appellant further 
argues that this alleged failure constitutes an abuse of discretion. See id. This, 
however, is not the case. Appellant stated his objections to Ms. Underhill's 
testimony and Appellee responded with her reasons why the testimony should be 
admitted. Record on Appeal, page 257-58, lines 12-25, and 1-5. The court then 
ruled that "she can testify as a rebuttal witness." Id., lines 4-5. The law does not 
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require the trial judge to make detailed findings on the record as to why it rules on 
each objection to evidence. 
Finally, even if this Court should somehow find the trial court erred in 
allowing Ms. Underbill's testimony, any alleged error was harmless. Appellant 
has the burden to show that absent the alleged error there is a reasonable 
likelihood that a different result would have been reached. See UTCO Associates, 
LTD. v. Zimmerman, 27 P.3d 177, 182 (Utah App. 2001). Appellant has failed to 
make this showing. In fact, Appellant concedes that it may have been appropriate 
for the parties to share the mortgage interest deduction equally since the parties 
resided together as husband and wife for all of 2000. See Appellant's Brief, page 
39. Appellant also concedes that "the trial court may not have believed Appellant 
that he had sought advise from his accountant and the accountant had advised him 
to claim the entire deduction and the business expense mileage." Id. Appellant 
goes on to state that, "if so, then it was harmless error to allow Ms. Underhill to 
testify." Id. Indeed it was harmless error. 
The trial court was entitled to believe whatever evidence was before him. 
As part of the record, the trial court had both parties' tax returns and testimony 
regarding deductions. Record on Appeal, 318, page 47-8, lines 23-25, 1-8. Even 
without the testimony of Ms. Underhill, the trial court could have appropriately 
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found that it was improper for Appellant to take 100% of the mortgage interest 
deduction and for Appellee to take 50% of this deduction. 
Appellant claims had he known that Ms. Underhill was going to testify 
regarding his mortgage interest deduction and mileage deduction, he would have 
called his own accountant to testify on his behalf. Appellant's Brief, page 39. 
This accountant would have apparently testified that he had advised Appellant to 
take the entire mortgage interest deduction and to deduct his mileage expense. Id, 
However, even if this accountant had so testified, the trial court could have 
properly concluded that the parties cannot collectively claim a 150% mortgage 
interest deduction. Therefore, because any alleged error regarding Ms. Underhill's 
testimony was harmless, the trial court's decision must stand. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing, Appellee respectfully asks this Court to uphold the 
trial Court's judgment in all respects and to award to Appellee her reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs in the prosecution of tjrfs^matter. 
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